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HISTORICAL TRUTH, NARRATIVE TRUTH, AND
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Marianne Wesson*
A number of remarkable issues are illuminated when a psychologist or
psychiatrist is invited to testify in a legal proceeding. Some of these issues
have commanded a great deal of scholarly and judicial attention. There is,
for example, the way in which such expert testimony emphasizes the
competing and to some degree incompatible premises of law and psychol-
ogy . There is the struggle to insure that important social judgments are not
made by the witness rather than by the jury, to whom they rightly belong. 2
There is an ongoing debate about the propriety of a court's reliance on an
expert's predictions about the dangerousness of an individual. 3 Each of
these subjects deserves the attention it has received. This article, however, is
concerned with a frequent concomitant of psychological expert testimony
that has largely escaped comment-the difficulty of exploiting the wit-
ness's expertise without giving undue weight to his conclusions about what
I will call "historical truth."
By "historical truth" I mean the question of what really happened in the
world. Although experts are not usually asked directly to state what they
believe to have happened in some historical time and place, their views on
such questions of historical truth often form an inevitable part of expert
testimony. For example, consider an expert hired to examine and testify
about the sanity of a defendant in a murder trial. The expert's commission
does not normally encompass making a binding judgment about (for
example) whether the victim of a crime invited the defendant into her room
or whether the defendant broke in forcibly. Yet in the process of arriving at a
conclusion about whether that defendant had substantial capacity to control
his conduct on the night in question, the expert very likely must, for his or
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado; A.B., Vassar College; J.D., University of
Texas.
1. See, e.g., Bromberg, Psychiatrists in Court: The Psychiatrist's View, 125 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1343 (1969); Roberts, Some Observations on the Problems of the Forensic Psychiatrist, 1965 Wis. L.
REV. 240.
2. See, e.g., Bazelon, New Godsfor Old: "Efficient" Courts in a Democratic Society, 46 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 653 (1971); Pugh, The Insanity Defense In Operation: A Practicing Psychiatrist Views Durham
and Brawner, 1973 WAsH. U.L.Q. 87.
3. See, e.g., Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness:
Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RuTGERs L. REv. 1084 (1976); Dix, Administration of the Texas
Death Penalty Statutes: Constitutional Infirmities Related to the Prediction of Dangerousness, 55 Tex.
L. Rev. 1343 (1977); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption ofExpertise: Flipping Coins in
the Courtroom, 62 CALIF L. REv. 693 (1974).
Washington Law Review Vol. 60:331, 1985
her own purposes, make some judgment. Moreover, the expert's judgment
about such a question of historical truth will probably, in the course of his or
her testimony, become known to thejury. The rules of evidence are designed
to permit just such communication of the expert's premises. 4 Having heard
the expert's view about "what really happened" on the night of the murder,
the jury is likely to be led to undervalue its own role in determining, on the
basis of the evidence before it, the historical truth. It is likely to be so misled
because of its natural inclination to give more credit to the version of
historical truth espoused by the expert than to competing versions. 5
This concern should be distinguished from the concern, mentioned
above, that the expert's judgment about questions such as the defendant's
sanity or competency will unduly influence the jury.6 Questions of sanity or
4. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(4) (statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment not
hearsay) and 703 (experts may disclose the bases of their opinions to the jury even though the facts or
data on which they rely are not admissible in evidence).
5. In Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444,451 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court noted, "It has often
been argued that in the guise of an expert, the psychiatrist became the thirteenth juror, and unfortunately
the most important one." See also United States v. Addison, 162 U.S. App. D.C. 199, 202, 498 F.2d
741,744, (1974) (scientific evidence "may... assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a
jury of laymen"); White v. Estelle, 554 F. Supp. 851, 858 (S.D. Tex. 1982) ("when this lay opinion is
proffered by a witness bearing the title of 'Doctor,' its impact on the jury is much greater than if it were
not masquerading as something it is not"), affd, 720 E2d 415 (5th Cir. 1983); Giannelli, The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L.
REv. 1197, 1237 (1980) ("The major danger of scientific evidence is its potential to mislead the jury; an
aura of scientific infallibility may shroud the evidence and thus lead the jury to accept it without critical
scrutiny" (footnotes omitted)).
6. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. There may be, however, useful parallels between this
topic and the question of whether experts have any special faculty that enables them accurately to predict
dangerous behavior, see supra note 3. Years of studies suggesting that psychiatric and psychological
experts cannot make such predictions with greater accuracy than lay persons have been insufficient to
deter some experts from testifying confidently on the subject, even when their testimony literally
affected life and death. See, e.g., Dix, Expert Prediction Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Evidentiary
and Constitutional Considerations, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1 (1981). The United States Supreme Court
recently refused to rule that the use of such discredited testimony as a basis for imposing the death
penalty violated a defendant's due process rights. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3416-17 (1983),
reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 209 (1983). One court, however, has accepted claims that the use of expert
testimony of such dubious reliability violates a capital defendant's constitutional rights. See People v.
Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 922 (1982).
The practice may decline regardless of judicial approval or disapproval as a result of the official
disapproval of the American Psychiatric Association (APA), which filed a brief amicus curiae in
Barefoot suggesting that there is no basis for lending expert predictions of dangerousness any greater
credence than lay predictions. Amicus Curiae Brief of American Psychiatric Association, Barefoot v.
Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383. It appears that the APA was led to take a position on the inappropriate uses of
psychiatric predictions of dangerousness by particularly controversial testimonial episodes, such as the
testimony in Barefoot. Moreover, lawyers have begun to acquire the sophistication necessary to focus a
trial court's or a jury's attention on the speculative character of an expert witness's prediction of
dangerousness. See 2 J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 72-112 (3d
ed. 1981) (suggested cross-examination techniques). Thus professional restraint and thoughtful
advocacy may, at least in some cases, accomplish what constitutional doctrine could not: limiting the
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competency do contain social judgments. Accordingly we are jealous of the
jury's ultimate decisionmaking power concerning them. Nevertheless they
also fall squarely within the boundaries of the special expertise that we
believe the witness to possess. Consequently we welcome the expert's
assistance in answering them, although we may use techniques to remind
the jury that it has the ultimate role in assessing conflicting testimony.7
Probably a similar belief prompts us to tolerate (or even fail to notice) the
expert's frequent domination in the matter of determining historical truth.
That is, we believe that such expert witnesses possess special expertise in
the determination of historical truth, and that belief accounts for our ready
acceptance of their influence on the jury's conclusions about it. But recent
work by experts trained in the psychoanalytic tradition suggests that if we
entertain this belief about witnesses with such training we are ascribing to
them powers of ratiocination that they do not have. Since many psycholog-
ists and psychiatrists who do serve as expert witnesses have been trained
wholly or partly in that tradition, this recent work suggests that we should
reevaluate the conventions and rules of evidence that rest on our erroneous
belief in their privileged access to matters of historical truth. '
This article examines studies tending to cast doubt on the existence of
any special faculty that enables psychoanalytically trained experts to dis-
cern the historical truth. It then illustrates, by examining the events at one
trial, the distortions in the trial process that can arise when experts do
purport to resolve issues of historical truth. Finally, it suggests some
solutions to the problems described.
I. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST PSYCHOANALYTIC EXPERTISE
ON MATTERS OF HISTORICAL TRUTH
The premise that psychoanalysts can uncover the truth about phenomena
in the world is as old as psychoanalysis. Freud compared the psychoanalyst
to an archaeologist, who sifts through mounds of refuse and finally
uncovers authentic artifacts of the buried civilization.8 And the metaphor
occasions when a factfinder might be led to cede its role in making an important determination to an
"expert" who has, in fact, no more expertise about the subject of his testimony than does the jury. This
article seeks to expose expert testimony that looks back into the past to the same critical scrutiny that has
been brought to bear on expert testimony that purports to see into the future.
7. See, e.g., the instructions for the jury and the expert witness approved in Washington v. United
States, 390 F.2d 444, 456-58 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
8. Apparently the archaeologist metaphor appears pervasively in Freud's writing. See D. SPENCE,
NARRATIvE TRUTH AND HISTORicAL TRUTH: MEANING AND INTERPRETATION IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 160
(1982) [hereinafter cited as D. SPENCE]. See, e.g., Freud, Constructions in Analysis, in 23 S. FREUD,
THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLErE PsYcHoLOGIcAL WoRKs OF SIGMUND FREUD 259 (J. Strachey
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persists; even contemporary psychoanalytic literature, Donald Spence
observes, presents the findings of analysts concerning their subjects as a
"record of the facts," rather than as an "interpretation of some of the
data." 9 However, certain modern psychoanalysts have recently questioned
the premise that psychoanalysts can or should discover "historical truth."
Donald Spence is a key exponent of this view. His interest is precisely in
debunking this pervasive but largely unarticulated premise.
Spence is principally concerned with the implications of his thesis for
psychoanalytic research. ' 0 The premise that psychoanalytic data are dis-
coverable historical truths has led to the development of a body of psycho-
analytic theory believed to be, like any other empirical theory, verifiable or
refutable by reference to this historical "data."" But lawyers should
consider Spence's arguments in detail, because they speak directly to the
law's treatment of the psychoanalytically-oriented expert witness as a
person who does have some privileged access to the historical truth.
Spence sets out to demonstrate that for a variety of reasons his profes-
sion's claim to competence at discovering historical truth is suspect. 12 He
begins by examining the assumption that the psychoanalytic process-
participated in by a subject who is directed to report all thoughts, memo-
ries, and associations without criticism or selection, and an analyst who is
ed. 1964) ("But just as the archaeologist builds up the walls of the building from the foundations that
have remained standing, determines the number and position of the columns from the depressions in the
floor and reconstructs the mural decorations and paintings from the remains found in the debris, so does
the analyst proceed when he draws his inferences from the fragments of memories, from the associa-
tions and from the behaviour of the subject of the analysis.").
On other occasions, however, Freud expressed the belief that the techniques of psychoanalysis were
not suited to excavating the past. Concerning the now-controversial matter of whether Freud's psychoan-
alytic patients who described sexual abuse in childhood were remembering real events or fabricating
them, see J.M. MASSON, THE ASSAULT ON TRUTH: FREUD's SUPPRESSION OF THE SEDUCTION THEORY
(1984). Apparently, Freud eventually arrived at the view that he would never know the historical truth
concerning any particular patient's experience. In The Introductory Lectures, he wrote: "[E]ven to-day
we have not succeeded in tracing any variation in the results according as phantasy or reality plays the
greater part in these experiences." Freud, The Paths of Symptom-Formation, in S. FREUD, A GENERAL
INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS 324-25 (J. Riviere ed. 1943).
9. D. SPENCE, supra note 8, at 26.
10. See D. SPENCE, supra note 8, at chapter VIII passim.
11. Cf T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTiFIC REVOLUTIONS 23-24 (1970) (scientific theorizing is
dependent upon a body of data against which theories can be tested).
12. Spence does not originate this argument (he gives credit to philosophers Serge Viderman and
Paul Ricoeur, among others, for their earlier articulations of it, see Ricoeur, The Question of Proof in
Freud's Psychoanalytic Writings, 25 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC A. 835 (1977); Viderman, The Analytic
Space: Meaning and Problems, 48 PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 257 (1979)), but his essay seems destined to
reach and persuade a larger audience than did his predecessors'. His persuasive power comes in part
from an invocation of modem philosophical thought (especially linguistics and aesthetics), experimen-
tal psychology, literary criticism, and work in the foundations of physics and the "hard" sciences. But
his argument draws much of its force from the circumstance that he is himself an analyst, and hence
uniquely qualified to take a critical look at the premises of a calling that is a mystery to most outsiders.
Vol. 60:331, 1985
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enjoined to absorb this report with "evenly-hovering attention"-will lead
in time to the discovery by both subject and analyst of the "real truth" about
the subject's past life. Spence opens his assault on this assumption by
observing that no coherent narrative, whether or not in some sense true, will
result if both subject and analyst obey their instructions. 13 If the subject
really reports his associations, memories, and dreams in the chaotic way
they first come into his consciousness, the analyst must supply some
critical organizing principle or the report will never advance beyond being
an indigestible jumble. If, on the other hand, the analyst is able to compre-
hend the subject's account with no more effort than the maintenance of
"evenly-hovering attention," it must be because the subject is supplying
some coherence, disobeying the injunction to relate the contents of his
consciousness without criticism or selection.
Spence supports his thesis that the rules of psychoanalysis, if taken
seriously, preclude coherent narrative by pointing to the non-home-
omorphic relationship between visual experience and verbal description,
employing striking examples from the history of art. In light of the essential
indescribability of all but the most simple visual perceptions, the only
psychoanalytic subject who really obeys his instructions may be the one
who is silent (and who, ironically, is often diagnosed as "resistant" to the
psychoanalytic process). 14
Spence argues, moreover, that even the communication of nonvisual
subjective experience is impossible if editing of the speaker's thoughts is
forbidden. Spence points out that the effective communication of non-
visual subjective experience requires a skilled narrator using sophisticated
techniques to signal point of view, genre, and other critical variables-a
task singularly beyond even the most talented novelist if she is required to
forswear any editing of her thoughts. 15 For all these reasons, there is bound
to be a great deal of slippage between the "real truth" of what the subject is
experiencing or remembering during the analytic hour, and what is commu-
nicated to the analyst.
Spence demonstrates that the psychoanalyst takes a further step away
from the historical truth when she supplies her own "unwitting interpreta-
tion" of the subject's productions, or (perhaps more seriously) influences
the subject to experience memories that do not accurately correspond to his
history. 6 The reality of the latter phenomenon is argued for by the work of
13. D. SPENcE, supra note 8, at 52-54.
14. Id. at 55-79.
15. Id. at 39-54.
16. Id. at 81-135.
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Elizabeth Loftus, author of the invaluable work Eyewitness Testimony 17 and
numerous studies of the fallability and mutability of memory.
Loftus demonstrated that persons exposed to visual stimuli in a film or
slides reported memories of the events depicted that varied dramatically
depending upon the wording of the questions that were put to them about
the event. Thus many subjects who saw a film of a car travelling down a
road, and who were asked (in the midst of a series of similar inquiries)
"How fast was the sports car going when it passed the barn while travelling
along the country road?," reported a week later that they remembered a
barn in the film, although in fact there had been none. 18
Spence does not argue that the analyst would set out, as Loftus did,
deliberately to induce a false memory. He suggests, however, that in the
process of talking with the subject about his memory, dream, or feeling, the
analyst may unintentionally supply a phrase or description, which the
subject seizes onto and incorporates into his private experience. 19 (Even
Freud, propounder of the archaeologist metaphor, wrote of the "screen
memory," a distorted or fabricated memory, but Freud believed that the
subject's private psychodynamic process supplied the screen.) 20 Further,
Spence suggests, the nature of the transference (the feelings that the subject
has about his analyst) influences the subject to produce certain material
even though it may have little correspondence to the historical truth. A
patient who is eager to be regarded as a rewarding and exceptional psycho-
analytic subject, for example, might embellish a vague or elusive memory
of childhood, expecting to please the analyst with a detailed and vivid
description.21
Spence argues, furthermore, that the psychiatrist's own psychodynamic
process may affect her ability to discover the historical truth about her
subject. Despite taking care to remain aware of her countertransference and
other personal issues, the analyst is bound on occasion to hear a production
in a certain way because to hear it in that way satisfies her own needs. Nor is
the analyst immune from defenses such as projection and intellectualization
that may prevent her from acknowledging that this is what she has done.22
Spence mentions an example of a therapist in training who brought to his
supervisor a tape of a session with a patient. The therapist explained to his
supervisor that the tape was not a complete record of the session, because
the patient had asked in the middle of the session that the tape recorder be
17. E. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
18. Id. at 60.
19. D. SPENCE, supra note 8, at 99-113.
20. Freud, Screen Memories, in 3 S. FREUD, THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHO-
LOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 303 (J. Strachey ed. 1962).
21. D. SPENCE, supra note 8, at 95.
22. See id. at 99-135.
336
Vol. 60:331, 1985
Historical Truth, Narrative Truth, and Expert Testimony
turned off so he could make a particularly painful disclosure. When the tape
was played, it became apparent that it was the therapist who had suggested
that the recorder be disengaged at the critical juncture. The therapist had no
memory of having made the suggestion, even after listening to the tape.
23
Thus, according to Spence, the analyst's confusion of the subject's process
with his own provides ample opportunity for distortion, which is com-
pounded by the unlikelihood that the confusion will ever be corrected. The
analyst's process notes form the basis for any supervision that she may be
receiving as well as for any account of the analysis that appears in peer-
reviewed literature. Such notes would most likely present the analyst's own
"hearing" of the production. Transcripts can make possible the detection of
errors such as that in the example, but transcripts have limitations as well;
most importantly, they cannot convey affect or inflection and they do not
accurately record periods of silence.24
The analyst's most significant contribution to the formulation of the
"truth" sought is to fit the huge volume of material produced in the course
of an analysis into an explanatory or illuminatory "pattern." Yet Spence
maintains that even the execution of this essential function may lead the
analyst to leave the historical "truth" further behind.25 In an important
passage, Spence (relying on a paper by Jacobsen and Steele) shows his
readers that even Freud succumbed on occasion to the lure of promoting
hypothesis to evidence in the service of a compelling explanation. In the
case of the "Wolf-Man," Freud described his patient's memory of watching
a maid kneeling on the floor with a pail and a short broom, teasing or
scolding the patient, who was then a child. Freud hypothesized from this
description that the boy had urinated on the floor. He then speculated
concerning whether the cause of this indiscretion was sexual excitement. In
the course of the case history, Freud constructed a compelling narrative
built around this simple memory, involving the boy's identification with his
father in the scene, the maid's joking threat to casirite the boy for his
conduct, and the boy's recollection, prompted by -the maid's posture, of a
primal scene. Yet, as Spence demonstrated, there is not a shred of evidence
that the boy had urinated on the floor-ir the scene, and without that link all
of the subsequent explanation evaporates. 26 Furthermore, it appears that
Freud, like the young therapist who didn't remember suggesting turning off
the tape recorder, was completely unaware of his contribution to the web of
23. Id. at 99 (quoting Wallerstein & Sampson, Issues in Research in the Psychoanalytic Process,
52 INT'L J. OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 11 (1971)).
24. D. SPENcE, supra note 8, at 215-37.
25. Id. at 127-74.
26. Id. at 117-22; Jacobsen & Steele, From Present to Past: FreudianArchaeology, 6 INT'L REV. OF
PSYcHOANALYSIS 349 (1979).
337
Washington Law Review
"truth" that he had woven; he wrote later in the "Wolf-Man" case history
that the scene as he had described it was "a spontaneous product of the
patient's memory, and no construction or stimulation by the physician
played any part in evoking it." 27
By the time the various transformations that Spence describes have
occurred, the distance between historical truth and psychoanalytic "truth"
is quite a gulf. From what "really happened" to what the subject or patient
remembers is one transformation; from what he remembers to what he
articulates is another; from what he says to what the analyst hears is
another; and from what the analyst hears to what she concludes 'is still
another. If Spence's arguments for the existence of this gulf are accepted,
what are the implications for the profession of psychoanalysis? Curiously,
on this question Spence seems to be ambivalent. At times he argues that
these difficulties can be overcome by the use of a technique that he
denominates "naturalizing" or "unpacking" the recorded transcript of the
analytic session. The technique requires that the analyst, very soon after the
session, annotate the transcript with her observations about what signifi-
cance she attaches to various productions of the subject and why; how the
session fits into the pattern of previous sessions; why the analyst responded
(or failed to respond) as she did at each juncture; and generally what
"background assumptions" must be brought to any understanding of the
session by one who was not present. Such "naturalized" transcripts must,
according to Spence, become the data on which any research in psycho-
analysis proceeds. 28
In other parts of the book, however, Spence suggests that his profession
disavow any competence to reconstruct the historical truth (in essence
disclaiming any resemblance to Freud's metaphorical archaeologist). He
suggests, moreover, that the profession accept that the result of the suc-
cessful psychoanalytic process is the construction (not reconstruction) of a
sort of truth Spence terms "narrative truth. ",29 The criterion for the "truth"
of an interpretation or explanation in this sense is its power to illuminate the
subject's life in a way that is useful to him, not its perfect correspondence to
the past.
Spence further elucidates the concept of narrative truth by comparing a
statement that enjoys "narrative truth" to what the philosopher M.G.
Singer calls "pragmatic statements." Singer's pragmatic statements are
made to induce belief in them, in order that they may thus become true.
Accordingly, in Singer's example, a politician may say that he will win next
week's election, not because he knows or even believes that it is true, but
27. D. SPENCE, supra note 8, at 119.
28. Id. at 239-62.
29. Id. at 263-78.
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because he hopes by making the statement to influence voters in his favor,
and hence ultimately to make the suggestion become true.30
Spence suggests a further comparison between "narratively true" state-
ments and the statements of an artist who seeks in artistic creations to
impress on the reader certain aesthetic "truths" not necessarily dependent
upon the literal truth of the statements.31 Hence Moby Dick contains, in this
sense, as much (or more) truth as a student's essay about what the student
did during summer vacation, even though the second may contain "histor-
ical truth" and the first contain none.32
In a review of Spence's book published in The New Yorker,33 Janet
Malcolm 34 takes Spence to task for assuming that psychoanalytic practi-
tioners believe that they are hearing or discovering historical truth. The
analyst looks for truth, says Malcolm, not in the content of the patient's
statements, but in the relationship between the patient and the analyst,
where the patient will eventually re-enact all of the important conflicts and
dramas of the patient's past. Hence, says Malcolm, Spence misunderstands
the analytic process when he complains that the transference relationship
can interfere with the patient's accurate descriptions of memories or asso-
ciations; it is in the nature of the transference, rather than in the described
30. Id. at 271-75.
31. Id. at 268-70.
32. These comparisons are provocative, but not entirely satisfactory Spence has some difficulty
articulating in any operational way a criterion for the "narrative truth" of a statement-difficulty that is
unsurprising considering the hazards of articulating an operational measure for artistic truth, sometimes
called "beauty." One of his efforts at definition is contained in his assertion that associations and
interpretations "become true as they become familiar and lend meaning to otherwise disconnected
pieces of the patient's life," id. at 280, a process he elsewhere describes as "finding a narrative home"
for the subject's productions, id. at 138. Similarly, but not redundantly, Spence argues that an
interpretation that facilitates the process of therapy by inducing in the subject new associations or other
helpful new clinical material enjoys some status as a "narrative truth." Id. at 279-83. Unfortunately for
this part of Spence's argument, these various definitions of "narrative truth" are not necessarily
consistent with one another-that is, some statements would apparently be true according to some of
the definitions and not according to others. Consider, for example, Freud's assertion that the patient he
called "Wolf-Man" had just urinated on the floor in the scene that he describes with the maid. See supra
note 26 and accompanying text. Suppose (as seems entiely jossible) the assertion is historically false,
but that the patient accepts Freud's reconstruction a5.trbe and even (per E. Lotrus, supra note 17) begins
to remember that things happened in that way. Bui suppose further that this created memory, rather than
facilitating the process of therapy, causes the patient to become blocked in his associations, or more
seriously, to become so displeased by the situation that he terminates the analysis. Freud's assertion
would, then, be true in the sense that it was integrated and accepted into the patient's belief system, but
untrue in the sense of facilitating the therapeutic process. Spence might object that it is impossible for
the patient to have accepted and believed the reconstruction if it was of a sort to induce blocking or
resignation, but there is nothing in his work that tells us why this should be so. Moreover, even if Freud's
reconstruction was true in neither of the senses considered above, it certainly (in the view of most
readers) would enjoy the sort of aesthetic or artistic persuasive power that Spence suggests as another
criterion for "narrative truth."
33. Malcolm, Six Roses ou Cirrhose? (Book Review), 58 NEw YORKER 96 (Jan. 24, 1983).
34. Malcolm is the author of PSYCHOANALYSIS: THE IMpossiaLE PROFESSION (1982).
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memories, that the analyst looks for clues to the patient's past. As Freud
observed, "[T]he patient does not say that he remembers that he used to be
defiant and critical toward his parents' authority; instead, he behaves in that
way to the doctor." 35
Similarly, Malcolm argues that the psychoanalyst is interested in neither
the historical truth of an account, nor in the narrative truth of it, which she
defines as "what might have happened." Instead, the analyst searches for
the psychoanalytic truth, which she defines as "the truth of what the present
betrays about the past." 36 According to Malcolm,
The analyst is only minimally interested in the story the patient is trying to
tell him. What he is really after is the story behind the story-the story that the
patient is not telling him-and this he can infer only from the patient's
behavior toward him (transference) and from his manner of disobeying the
fundamental rule of free association (resistance).37
Malcolm's view of the rule of historical truth in psychoanalysis is
consistent with that of analysts who have given their attention to the nature
of the psychoanalytic narrative. Roy Schafer, for example, writes in his
essay "Narration in the Psychoanalytic Dialogue" 38 of the gulf between the
traditional notion of psychoanalysis as a truth-seeking enterprise and his
conception of it as a creative narrative enterprise:
Traditionally, the official psychoanalytic conception of reality has been
straightforwardly positivistic. Reality is "out there" or "in there" in the inner
world, existing as a knowable, certifiable essence. At least for the analytic
observer, the subject and object are clearly distinct. Reality is encountered and
recognized innocently: in part it simply forces itself on one; in part it is
discovered or uncovered by search and reason free of theory ....
But this positivistic telling is . .. incoherent with respect to the epis-
temological assumptions inherent in psychoanalytic inquiry, that is, those
assumptions that limit us always to dealing only with versions of reality .. .
In this account, reality is always mediated by narration. Far from being
innocently encountered or discovered, it is created in a regulated fashion. 39
Since Schafer and others so freely concede the non-scientific status of
psychoanalytic truth, Malcolm may be correct in suspecting Spence of
laboring to disprove a myth that analysts no longer believe. But her
35. S. FREUD, THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND
FREUD 150 (J. Strachey ed. 1958) cited in MALCOLM, supra note 34, at 100.
36. Id. at 103.
37. Id.
38. Schafer, Narration in the Psychoanalytic Dialogue, in ON NARRATIVE 25 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed.
1980).
39. Id. at 45.
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observations do not diminish, indeed they enhance, the drastic implications
of Spence's argument for forensic psychiatry and psychology. The function
of the courtroom proceeding is often precisely to ascertain the historical
truth, and quite frequently the "mental health professional" is asked to aid
the factfinder-judge or jury-in that task. Great difficulties face the well-
intentioned expert witness who either cannot discover historical truth
(according to Spence) or is not much interested in it (according to Schafer
and Malcolm). Less scrupulous experts may seek to parley their expert
status into an invitation to argue their personal view of historical truth to a
jury, although their expertise may not justify affording their views any
deference. 40 Thus there is a mismatch between what we expect from or
permit such witnesses and what they are competent to provide. Seeking a
solution to this mismatch may be a far more important task than others in
the field of law and psychiaty that are more frequently urged, such as
reformulating the insanity defense.
II. THE MISCHIEF IN RELYING ON PSYCHOANALYTIC
EXPERTISE IN MATTERS OF HISTORICAL TRUTH
The rules of evidence,41 the deference that a jury usually accords expert
testimony,42 and the difficulty of cross-examining an expert witness con-
cerning the factual foundations that underlie the expert's conclusions43 all
conspire to conceal the extent to which a trial jury's prerogative to weigh the
credibility of witnesses and find facts is often undermined when an expert
psychologist or psychiatrist testifies. We are accustomed to tolerating this
result, perhaps in part because we have believed in the premise that Spence
has attacked-the premise that the psychoanalyst-as-archaeologist can tell
40. It may be objected that Spence's critique of his profession's expertise in matters of historical
truth is largely irrelevant to the law's use of mental health professionals as experts because very few of
them are psychoanalysts. But a mental health professional need not have psychoanalytic certification to
have been exposed to the psychoanalytic or dynamic theory of human behavior. Indeed, the clinical
psychologists and psychiatrists who do forensic work often have been trained largely but not exclusively
in the psychoanalytic tradition (inside of which there is plenty of room for disagreement). Moreover,
those forensic professionals with psychoanalytic training or expertise often cite this training as the
source of their particular acumen in helping the legal process arrive at accurate results. See, e.g.,
Salzman, Psychiatric Interviews as Evidence: The Role of the Psychiatrist in Court-Some Suggestions
and Case Histories, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 853, 874 (1962) ("The casual, brief interviews by
psychiatrists whose skill lies only in descriptive and classificatory psychiatry can no longer serve the
interests of the community or of justice to the accused. Depth interviews by dynamically trained
psychiatrists will obviate much of the criticism that now falls upon the expert witness. They will not only
be convincing, but will be so compelling that the petty contentiousness which now characterizes the
psychiatric witness will be minimized.").
41. See supra note 4.
42. See supra note 5.
43. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
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us what is the historical truth about a matter. But if Spence is right, then our
view of forensic psychology should be radically changed. If it is true that
mental health professionals have no special competence at uncovering the
"historical truth," then a number of the rules of evidence and procedure
governing expert testimony may be dysfunctional.
An expert whose understanding of the historical truth is inaccurate may
undermine the truth-seeking function of a trial in several ways. First, the
expert's opinion will, at least in part, be based upon his understanding about
"what happened"; if he is mistaken in what he understands, his con-
clusions may be erroneous, or he may have a misplaced degree of con-
fidence in them. Second, the rules of evidence permit the expert to convey
to the jury the bases of his conclusions." If, in doing so, he describes the
historical truth incorrectly, he may mislead the factfinder by conveying that
the version of the historical truth at which he has arrived is indisputable, 45
or by suggesting that he is equipped with some special faculty that gives his
version of truth more credibility than alternate versions that might be
supported by other evidence. 46 Finally, the rules of evidence now often
permit statements made to a medical expert for purposes of diagnosis or
treatment to come into evidence despite any hearsay objection. 47 The
hearsay exception represents a considerable liberalizing of older rules that
44. FED. R. EvID. 703, 705.
45. See R. ARENS, INSANITY DEFENSE 69 (1974) (psychiatric witnesses present their conclusions
with an "air of certitude"); Connolly & McKellar, Forensic Psychology, 16 BULL. BRIT. PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL SOC'Y (No. 51, reprint) 3 (1963) ("When questions of testimony are involved, our legal informants
have the strong impression that the court-that is to say the jury, judge, etc.-tend to be more impressed
by the witness who can give his evidence with 'absolute certainty.' The witness who qualifies his
statements and makes minor reservations for thesake of greater accuracy makes relatively less impact.
This may not seem unreasonable but we know from many laboratory experiments that certainty is no
absolute guarantee that the witness is correct or any more accurate."). Expert witnesses may be tempted
to exaggerate their confidence because they believe that juries will discount their testimony if they
equivocate, and they may be right. See R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 163-70
(1967) (jurors were in general annoyed by a psychiatric expert's failure to be more categorical, and
"wanted to hear the expert say what he would do if the decision was in his hands").
Lawyers also contribute to the pressure on experts to testify with more confidence than they feel, by
pursuing and rewarding expert witnesses who are willing to quell their reservations when they get on the
stand. One Dr. Grigson, who testified in Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981), that there was a "one hundred percent and absolute chance" that the
defendant would commit future acts of violence if not put to death, has apparently been rewarded for his
confident manner with employment by the prosecution in at least thirty death penalty cases. J.
ROBITSCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY 199 (1980). He has been asked to examine more than eight
thousand accused felons. Id. He has been denounced by the American Psychiatric Association for his
exaggeration of the degree of certainty that such predictions carry. See supra note 6. Lawyers also
pressure prospective witnesses directly to abandon their objectivity and serve as advocates for the
litigant who has retained them. See, e.g., the account of the pressures placed on a prospective witness
given in W. GAYLIN, THE KILLING OF BONNIE GARLAND 193-99 (1982).
46. See infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(4).
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were designed to prevent the introduction of the self-serving statements of a
party to litigation through the mouth of the party's chosen physician. 48
Although it enjoys considerable scholarly approval, the more liberal hear-
say exception may serve to hinder the truth-seeking function of the trial by
giving a special status to one particular account of the "historical truth"-
the account given to a mental health professional by the person whose
mental state, sanity, or emotional condition is the subject of the litigation.
The well-intentioned expert may try heroically to avoid exceeding his
expertise when confronted with issues of historical truth, only to find that he
cannot avoid resolving questions of historical truth in the course of forming
his opinion. Consider the following example: A clinical psychologist is
asked to examine a defendant charged with felony-murder, for purposes of
determining whether the defendant was sane at the time of the offense. The
police offense report, a copy of which is furnished to the psychologist,
indicates that the defendant made the acquaintance of his young female
victim in a laundromat, that he followed her home after she left the
laundromat to avoid his attentions, that he picked the lock on her apartment
door with a plastic credit card, and that she died of strangulation in a
struggle as he attempted to rape her. In many hours of interviews with the
defendant, the psychologist has heard (in the midst of much other material)
that the defendant's mother was an extremely disturbed woman who would
frequently behave seductively toward the defendant when he was a child,
and then spank him or beat him when he responded affectionately The
defendant also gives an account of the crime that differs in some significant
respects from the account contained in the police reports. He recounts that
he was acquainted with his victim before the night of the crime, having
danced with her several times at a local tavern; that she did not leave the
laundromat to escape from him, but rather invited him to come home with
her, going ahead so she could put her laundry away while his was in the
dryer; that he did not pick the lock, but that she opened the door for him;
that she went to the bedroom, undressed, and began to make love with him;
and that after several minutes she suddently became hostile and violent, and
began to struggle and hit him. The defendant claims that he cannot
remember exactly what happened after that: he vaguely recalls walking
home from her apartment, and the later arrival of the police to arrest him.
The psychologist faced with such material must decide how to deal with
the issue of the historical truth concerning what happened the night of the
killing. He has several alternatives, or he may employ a combination of
them. He may form an opinion about the historical truth based solely on the
account given by the defendant, deciding from the defendant's demeanor,
48. See C. McCoRMICK, McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 293 (E. Cleary
ed. 1972).
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consistency, and plausibility what portions of his account to believe or
disbelieve. 49 Or the psychologist may employ tests, both objective and
projective, to explore the defendant's character and to aid in the decision of
whether to credit his account of the cnme.50 The psychologist may attempt
to resolve the discrepancies between the various accounts, perhaps by
conducting an investigation of his own that might include interviewing the
witnesses whose reports appeared in the police version of the crime; he
might, by using such techniques, eventually satisfy himself concerning
what really happened. 51 Finally, the psychologist may conclude that all or
some aspects of the "historical truth" are irrelevant to his opinion con-
cerning sanity, and hence that he need not resolve the discrepancies.52
None of these methods is completely satisfactory. Consider the efforts of
the prospective expert witness who conscientiously seeks out multiple
sources of information in an attempt to determine the "historical truth" of
an occurrence. For example, in the alleged rape-murder situation above, the
examining expert might conclude after many hours of investigation and
consideration that the defendant's account of his mother's behavior is
substantially accurate, and that the defendant is telling the truth about the
details of his encounter with the victim. Suppose the expert concludes on
the basis of this determination that at the time of the crime the defendant
satisfied the prevailing criteria for the insanity defense, and at trial he so
testifies. Although careful and responsible, this expert's behavior is suscep-
tible to the objection that he has effectively stolen from the jury its
responsibility for determining which of the witnesses to believe and what
inferences to draw from the evidence. Such a theft would, perhaps, be
tolerable if the expert's view of the past were entitled to a special deference,
but Spence's work suggest that it is not.53
Cross-examination may, of course, pursue questions about the factual
premises on which the expert's opinion rests. For a variety of reasons,
49. See, e.g., Gerard, Psychiatric Evaluation, in A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND THE MENTAL
HEALTH SYSTEM 21, 23 (1974).
50. See, e.g., Testimony of Dr. Martin Ome, in THE TRIAL OF PATrY HEARST 294-300 (1976)
[hereinafter HEARST TRANSCRIP'T]. The HEARST TRANSCRIPT contains a complete, unedited transcnpt of
the Hearst trial.
51. See, e.g., J.M. MACDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL 116-19 (3d ed. 1976) (recom-
mending that the expert consult outside sources, including the statements of other witnesses, and in
some cases interview other witnesses); HEARSTTRANSCRIPT, supra note 50, at 421 (testimony of Dr. Joel
Fort).
52. See, e.g., infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
53. Even the few safeguards against erroneous histoncal interpretations that might exist in the
setting of psychoanalytic therapy or analysis are absent when an expert evaluates a subject for litigation
purposes. The forensic psychologist or psychiatnst cannot, as Janet Malcolm suggests a therapist can,
see text accompanying supra note 35, glean clues to the historical truth from the nature of the
transference that ensues; the brief relationship between subject and forensic witness cannot provide the
setting in which a transference will develop.
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however, it is often not effective in exposing the issue of historical truth to
the critical examination of the jury.54 Experts, having committed them-
selves to an opinion on the question of, for example, sanity, often respond to
questions about the plausibility of one of their factual premises with the
rejoinder that the truth of that particular premise is after all unimportant
because their opinion is based on so many various premises that the loss of
one is not critical. 55 In the face of such a response, the question-and-answer
format of cross-examination is not effective to convey that the expert's data
base consists of a collection of such individual items, and that there may be
many other items in it that the cross-examiner cannot discredit, but whose
value depends entirely on their unproved historical truth.
A further obstacle to full exploration of historical truth may arise when
the cross-examiner does not have any specific evidence to disprove one of
the expert's premises, for example, that the defendant was telling the truth
about his mother's behavior.56 If cross-examination seeks to discredit the
validity of an unproven premise, the expert may parry with the suggestion
that because of special clinical training or expertise, the expert can sort out
truth from lies and arrive at a confident conclusion about "what really
happened."' 57 Spence's work suggests that this proposition is false. Not
infrequently, these explicit or implicit claims of near-omniscience are made
by an expert who will agree, if asked directly, that persons in the expert's
profession are not equipped to do "detective work. ' ' 58 Nevertheless, the
jury may be led to rely on the expert's version of the past because it imagines
that the expert is somehow more skilled than the jurors at discovering the
truth. 59 An expert may use the results of psychological tests (especially
projective tests such as the Rorschach ink-blot in which there is no oppor-
tunity for "lying") to bolster her confidence about, and the jury's belief in,
the version of historical truth on which she relies. Some experts, for
example, will claim that it is reasonable to believe a history given by an
individual who shows no tendency to malinger or present a false picture on
a test like the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory.60 All of these
varieties of expert testimony tend both to create and to obscure an important
54. A similar observation is made in Note, Hearsay Bases of Psychiatric Opinion Testimony: A
Critique of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 129, 145-46 (1977).
55. See, e.g., infra notes 62--64 and accompanying text.
56. See D. SPENcE, supra note 8, at 168 ("many interpretations become true because there is
simply no disconfirming evidence to be used against them").
57. See, e.g., HEARST TRANSCRiPT, supra note 50, at 294-300 (testimony of Dr. Martin Orne).
58. See, e.g., id. at 288 (testimony of Dr. West).
59. See supra note 5.
60. See, e.g., HEARsTTIRANScIcPr, supra note 50, at 275 (testimony of Dr. West: "we know she is
not trying to deceive us because the L scale, or the Y scale is right on normal"); id. at 313 (testimony of
Dr. Ome that psychological test results bolstered his conviction that Hearst was giving an accurate
history of her ordeal).
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problem-that the expert is doing the jury's job when he resolves questions
of historical truth in his own mind and then testifies to an opinion based on
his version of the past.
Some examples of the confusion that may be produced in such a situation
are found in one of the most interesting criminal trials of recent years-the
1976 trial of Patricia Hearst for bank robbery. The defense did not claim
insanity, but it did seek to introduce evidence, including expert testimony,
relevant to the defense of duress. Many of the expert witnesses employed
one or more of the testimonial techniques described above.
A. The "It Doesn't Matter Anyway" Premise
Dr. Louis Joloyn West, Chair of the Department of Psychiatry at UCLA
Medical School and Psychiatrist-in-Chief of UCLA Hospitals, testified for
the defense. In one bit of testimony, West recounted a particular incident
that contributed to his conclusion that Hearst acted under duress. The
incident concerned a statement that Hearst had made, after her arrest and
while she was being held in custody, to her childhood friend Trish Tobin.
Hearst told Tobin that when she was free she wanted to tell the story of her
involvement with the Symbionese Liberation Army "from a revolutionary
feminist perspective." 61 On cross-examination, West was asked to recon-
cile that statement with his testimony that Hearst acted under duress when
committing crimes with SLA members. He replied that at the time she
made the statement to Tobin, Hearst had been in a small room and that
Emily Harris (one of the more unpleasant SLA members) had been in the
room with her, implying that Hearst spoke as she did while in fear of Harris.
West conceded that his source for the information that Emily Harris was
present at the "radical feminist" conversation was Patty Hearst herself. The
prosecution was later able to establish from jail records that Emily Harris
was not present when Heart met with Tobin.62
When the prosecution inquired of Dr. West what alteration his opinion
would undergo if it could be shown that Harris was not in fact present at the
conversation, West met the challenge with aplomb. He testified: "I'd find
that fascinating; and, it would suggest to me that-and quite consistent
with some of the other findings-that to her, Emily Harris was a constant
presence as long as she was there. ",63 Hence Dr. West, his factual premises
discredited, retreated to the position that his conclusion was based on so
many pieces of data that a blow to the truth value of any one piece of data
61. Id. at 273.
62. Id. at 291.
63. Id. at 273.
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could not affect his confidence in his opinion. Indeed, West demonstrated
that he could cleverly reweave a new or contradictory fact into the fabric of
his opinion so that it contributed to, rather than detracted from, the opin-
ion's authority.
Nor was this technique for avoiding issues having to do with historical
truth confined, in the Hearst trial, to the defense witnesses. Dr. Harry L.
Kozol, a prosecution witness, based his estimate of Hearst's character (and
hence a portion of his conclusion that she acted as she did out of feelings of
rebellion against her family and authority) in part on a report that Hearst had
once lied that her mother was suffering from cancer in order to avoid taking
a high school examination. 64 When asked whether his opinion would
change, should it be proved that there had been no such incident, Kozol
replied, "No, it doesn't. I am glad-I am glad to hear it. I am perfectly
willing to believe it, but it doesn't change my opinion on the total picture,
that is only one tiny item." ' 65
B. The "I couldn't be wrong" Premise
Another testimonial pattern that appears in the Hearst trial is the claim by
an expert witness that he could not be mistaken in his view of the historical
truth because he could not have been deceived by his subject. Dr. Robert Jay
Lifton, distinguished author of many psychiatric works, rested nearly his
entire testimony for the defense on Hearst's account of her life with the
SLA. When confronted with a piece of evidence that seemed not to fit with
her account, he suggested at first that it was not to be believed, and second
that in any event it was quite consistent with his opinion:
Q:... Doctor, did you hear the testimony in the courtroom that she told
somebody to keep his expletive deleted head down?
A: I either heard that testimony or read it.
Q: And again is that consistent, in your theory, with your theory of terror
and fear?
A: Well, my impression was that she denied having said that and that that
was quite uncertain as to whether she did say it.
Q: Well, let's assume that she did say it...
A: If she did say it, which I am not ready to assume, but if she did say it, it
could be perfectly consistent with carrying out the role as well as she could of
looking like a revolutionary bank robber.66
64. Id. at 523.
65. Id. at 534.
66. Id. at 332.
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Lifton asserted at the close of his cross-examination that it was impossible
that he had been deceived by Hearst.67
A prosecution expert witness, Dr. Joel Fort, began his testimony by
taking to task psychiatric experts in general for their tendency to accept
uncritically whatever they are told by a subject whom they are examining. 68
And indeed the testimony of Drs. West and Lifton suggests that this
criticism is merited. But Dr. Fort then proceeded to testify as though he, too,
had some special faculty that enabled him to divine the historical truth-he
simply reconstructed it from different sources than did the defense experts.
Commenting on the significance of an incident in which Hearst used
machine-gun fire to cover the escape of two SLA members from a store
where they had been caught shoplifting, Fort prefaced his answer, "[A]s I
piece together the investigative reports and the testimony regarding that
incident," and concluded that Hearst's account of the incident was
"unbelievable." 69 This inadvertent confession makes clear that Fort com-
mitted the same sin as West and Lifton: assuming some privileged access to
the historical truth. He merely regarded his methods for discovering that
truth as better than those of the opposing witnesses.
Yet scattered through the expert testimony may also be found disclaimers
by experts of any special ability to detect lies or otherwise to ascertain the
historical truth. Dr. West testified at one point, "I am not a detective. I am a
psychiatrist." 70 Dr. Martin Orne, a defense witness, agreed that he had
testified in another trial that psychiatrists are not very good at "recognizing
the truth."' 7' He elaborated that he could not testify with any degree of
confidence as to whether "a specific event really happened." 72 Dr. Orne did
believe, though, that he could discern by the use of psychological tests
whether an individual was truly afflicted with a pathological condition or
was malingering. His distinction between historical truth and psychological
truth seems quite useful. Unfortunately, it was left behind when Orne was
asked on what factual premises he based his opinion that Hearst had been
under duress. He testified, "there were certain facts which were known and
which I had from-particularly from the detailed history and compilation
which Dr. West and Dr. Singer had made. " 73 In other words, Dr. Orne had
to depend in the end on Patty Hearst's account.
Later in his testimony, Dr. Orne stated, "taking it all very carefully
together, the weight of the data is unequivocably, [sic] in my view, that she
67. Id. at 334.
68. Id. at 421.
69. Id. at 438.
70. Id. at 288.
71. Id. at 301-02.
72. Id. at 302.
73. Id. at 308.
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was not simulating when I saw her. She was truthful with me."' 74 Hence his
earlier careful distinction between his ability to detect malingering and his
inability to detect falsehood seemed to have vanished even from Dr. Orne's
own mind. By the end of his redirect testimony, Dr. Orne was asserting that
he was confident that he had been working from an accurate history of
Patricia Hearst's ordeal. 75
In the middle of so much testimony that depends for its authority on the
premise that the opinion-holder can sort out truth from falsehood, it is odd
to find that the trial judge repeatedly admonished the jury that they were the
sole judges of the truth of any person's testimony and that they were to
disregard any expert witness's opinion concerning whether someone had
told the truth.76 (This admonition was prompted once by Dr. Orne's charac-
terization of Hearst as truthful and later by the testimony of Dr. Fort that a
particular statement made by Hearst was "unbelievable.") The instruction
reflects the law's assignment of the role of credibility-judge to the jury. But
this assignment, emphasized at some times, is undermined at others when
experts are permitted to judge the credibility of various "witnesses"
(whether or not those persons actually testify at trial) in the process of
arriving at their opinion.
C. The "I've known it all along" Premise
The slippery nature of historical truth ought to generate great concern
about the extent to which, as Spence suggests, the predisposition of the
expert becomes an important determinant of which version of the past he
believes, and what conclusions he draws from it.77 A large body of experi-
mental data supports the hypothesis that examiner inclination is a major
determinant of diagnosis; moreover, some studies go further and indicate
that the behavior of the examiner is a critical determinant of what data the
74. Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 313. The distinction is an important, but difficult, one. It has eluded some courts on
occasion. In Colorado, for example, courts have properly recognized that the rules of evidence permit a
witness, regardless of expertise, to express an opinion concerning the credibility of another witness.
See, e.g., People v. Ashley, 687 P.2d 473,475 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984). But one court has gone further to
suggest that an expert may be allowed to testify that the victim of a crime was "not fabricating" his
account of the crime, so long as the defense has made the witness's credibility an issue. See People v.
Ortega, 672 P.2d 215, 218 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983). The latter sort of testimony goes beyond a simple
assessment of whether the victim is in general a credible person, and enters the realm of treating the
expert as though the expert has some special knowledge, unavailable to others, about the historical truth.
There is some research evidence that mental health professionals are not particularly accurate even in
the assessment of malingering or credibility. See I J. zisKiN, COPING wrTH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOG-
ICAL TEsTIMoNY 429-41 (3d ed. 1981).
76. HEARST TRANsCRIPr, supra note 50, at 294, 438.
77. See text accompanying supra notes 22-27.
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examinee produces. 78 These studies lend credence to Spence's argument
that examiner or psychoanalyst expectations may shape the "story" that is
produced and believed more powerfully than any set of historical circum-
stances.
In the Hearst trial there was significant evidence that one of the principal
witnesses had, in fact, formed some opinion of Hearst's culpability (and
hence necessarily of "what happened") before ever examining Hearst.
Prior to Hearst's arrest, Dr. West wrote a letter to her parents in which he
stated in part:
Enclosed are a couple of reprints on the subject of so-called ["brainwashing"].
From them, you can see that considerable work from medical and psychiatric
stand-viewpoint has been reported concerning the extent to which single-
minded captors can profoundly influence individuals who come under their
control. There's much that could be elaborated on the subject; but, at this time,
I would make the following points: ...there are historical precedents for
special legal consideration if such a victim [sic] . . . .In spite of the charges
that have been filed against [Patricia], I believe powerful medical and legal
arguments can be mobilized for her defense.79
Questioned concerning whether these preliminary conclusions might have
influenced his later examination of Hearst or his conclusions, West bristled:
I approached the examination of this patient not only with my usual objec-
tivity, but with excessive precautions against the fact that since I'm an expert
on brainwashing and have been called by the Judge for this purpose, not to let
myself be biased and to see things that I was looking for. . . .I feel that this
account, this case study of this patient, is as honorable and unbiased and
scientific as any psychiatric case study that's ever been done.80
Yet West's claims to "scientific" objectivity are thrown even further into
doubt by some of his own testimony. For example, West testified that among
the disorienting experiences suffered by Hearst in captivity was sleep
deprivation. When asked whether Hearst had complained of sleep depriva-
tion during her examination by him, West replied, "She complained of
practically nothing . . . I had to pry it out of her, all of it.'81 West also
admitted that at the very outset of his examination he had informed Hearst
what her defense was to be, as follows:
[T]o emphasize the involuntary and violent way in which you were dragged
out of a relatively normal life with a forcible and terrifying sort of indoctrina-
tion that you got, and the tremendous pressure of threats in the beginning to
78. See Wesson, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 1980
Wis. L. REv. 697, 711 n.69, 712 n.72 (citing studies).
79. HEARST TRANSCRiPT, supra note 50, at 288-89.
80. Id. at 289.
81. Id. at 268.
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make you subservient and compliant with the leadership of this group so that
they would be able to keep control of you. I think myself that is the best
explanation for what happened. I haven't heard anything to make me think
otherwise. Doesn't that sound logical to you?82
West also said that Hearst had a very poor memory for the events of her
captivity.83 A situation more suited to the generation of a version of the
historical truth that conforms to the examiner's expectations can hardly be
imagined: a subject with little memory, an examiner who has already
committed himself to a theory of the events, and an interviewing technique
that consists of "prying" things out of the subject or suggesting them to her.
Seen in this light, West's indignant claim that his opinion about Hearst is as
"honorable and unbiased and scientific" as any case study ever done is
reminiscent of Freud's assertion that his "Wolf-Man" study is entirely the
product of his subject's memories, in which "no construction or stimula-
tion by the physician played any part." 84
III. TOWARD RESTORING THE JURY'S ROLE IN
ASCERTAINING HISTORICAL TRUTH
Is there any solution to the problem of historical truth as a basis for expert
testimony? One technique for eliminating some of the difficulties associ-
ated with an expert's overreliance on his favored version of the past is the
old-fashioned hypothetical question.85 There was a time when the law of
evidence, perhaps in recognition of the central role of the jury in ascertain-
ing historical truth, required that questions assuming matters not personally
known to the expert witness be put to her in the form of hypothetical
questions. 86 The form of the question, although often criticized as con-
fusing and tedious, 87 at least made clear to the jury and to the expert that it
was not the expert's task to arrive at any version of the truth; her function
was to articulate an opinion based on a set of premises, the truth of which
premises was left for the jury to determine.
It is tempting to argue for the reinstitution of the requirement that experts
testify in the form of responses to hypothetical questions as a solution to
82. Id. at 287.
83. Id. at 253.
84. See text accompanying supra notes 25-27.
85. For a general discussion, see Note, The Expert Witness and the Hypothetical Question, 13 W.
Rrsa iVE L. REv. 755 (1962).
86. See, e.g., C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 48, at 31.
87. See, e.g., 21.WIGMORE,EvIDENcE NTRLSATCOMMONLAW§ 686(J. Chadboumrev. 1979);
Guttmacher, Viewpoint of the Psychiatrist, 13 MD. L. REv. 283, 305, 310-11 (1953) (in The Doctor in
Court-Expert Medical Testimony: A Symposium).
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expert preemption of the question of historical truth. The difficulty,
however, with hypothetical questions is that most experts rely on hundreds
or thousands of factors-tangible and intangible, narrative and non-nar-
rative-in arriving at their opinions. A hypothetical question could not do
justice to the expert's premises unless it were impossibly long and complex.
Moreover, often the expert relies on a Gestalt-like pattern of behavior,
history, and presentation such that the whole of her clinical impression is
more than the sum of its parts. 88 No dry recitation of hypothetical facts can
give an expert the same confidence in her conclusions about them as can a
series of personal encounters with an actual subject. (Principally for this
reason, the American Psychiatric Association has declared that it is
unethical for a psychiatrist to offer a professional opinion unless she has
conducted an examination of the subject.) 89 Such considerations in part led
to the relaxation of evidentiary rules requiring experts to testify in response
to hypothetical questions, and to the adoption of more flexible rules
permitting an expert to state her opinion and then to disclose the bases of the
opinion if asked. 90
Some reaffirmation of the jury's primary role in judging the historical
truth might be accomplished through the use of ajury instruction, appropri-
ately stressed by counsel in closing arguments. Some courts have
responded to the work of Loftus and other critics of the accuracy of
eyewitness testimony by fashioning a special instruction cautioning the jury
about the frequent unreliability of such testimony.9' A similar instruction
concerning the jury's paramount role in determining "what happened,"
incorporating the proposition that there is no reason to give special weight
to any expert's belief about that subject, might raise the jury's con-
sciousness on those points and suggest fruitful lines of argument to coun-
sel. 92
88. Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness:Some Ruminations and Specula-
tions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1335, 1346-47 (1965) ("No hypothetical question can ever be formulated
which would contain sufficient facts to justify a really valid psychiatric inference. This is because the
modem, psychodynamically-oriented psychiatrist simply does not assemble diagnostic facts A, B, and
C about his patient and thus arrive at conclusion D. . . . [H~e cannot derive a valid conclusion from
such phenomena until he puts them together with his own subjective relationship to the examinee within
the context of the latter's total background."); Amicus Curiae Brief of APA, supra note 6, at 18. ("In our
view, the use of hypothetical questions is no substitute for an in-depth psychiatric examination and
evaluation .... ").
89. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, WiTH ANNOrA-
TIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 7(3), at 9 (1981).
90. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 705; UNIF. R. EvID. 58; UNIF. ACT ON EXPERT TESTIMONY § 9.
91. For a collection of state cases regarding jury instructions on eyewitness identification testimony,
see Annot., 23 A.L.R. 4th 1089 (1983).
92. Current law would seem to sanction such an instruction. Courts often state that a jury may reject
an expert opinion if it finds that the opinion was based on an incorrect view of the facts. See, e.g., United
States v. Ingman, 426 F.2d 973,977 (9th Cir. 1970); Mason v. United States, 402 F.2d 732, 737 (8th Cir.
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Trial lawyers should think harder about the issue of historical truth, and
devise techniques of advocacy that better expose the disputable nature of
the expert's premises than do most cross-examinations essayed today. Such
techniques might include inquiring whether an expert witness is familiar
with the work of Spence, and what effect Spence's observations have on his
confidence in his conclusions. An attorney who questions an expert's
historical premises might also consider calling his own expert witness who
espouses Spence's or similar views. In expounding these views the witness
would focus the jury's attention on the doubtful wisdom of the original
expert's reliance on his judgments about historical truth.
Finally, expert witnesses ought to study the arguments of such authors as
Spence and Schafer, and consider whether they are not persuaded that they
should be more modest in their claims to have the ability to pierce the veil
that separates us from the past. It would be refreshing and encouraging to
hear an expert testify along the following lines:
It is my conclusion that the defendant lacked substantial capacity to control
his conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect. I must qualify this
conclusion, however, by stating that it depends in large degree upon the truth
of certain statements made to me by the defendant. I have no way of being
certain that these statements are true; making such determinations is not ajob
for which I am trained or qualified.93
CONCLUSION
Spence suggests that the psychoanalyst94 is equipped neither by training
nor by method for the detection of historical truth. Moreover, Spence is
concerned about the implications of this circumstance for the scientific
status of research in psychoanalysis. I have suggested that whatever their
research consequences, Spence's arguments, if accepted, are subversive of
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 950 (1969).
93. In the area of predictions of dangerousness, see supra notes 3, 6, one authority suggests that the
responsible expert may wish to qualify his testimony as follows: "Your Honor, my clinical impression is
that the defendant may be physically assaultive in the near future. . . ; however, I should warn the
court that predictions in this area are highly inaccurate and there is a risk of hospitalizing a non-
dangerous person." Poythress, Coping on the Witness Stand: Learned Responses to Learned Treatises,
PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 139, 146 (1980).
In W. GAYLIN, supra note 45, at 202, the author, a psychiatrist, eloquently describes the dangers
posed by expert witnesses who testify with more confidence than they truly experience: "To be
physician and advocate, to see ambiguity everywhere and feel committed to certitude will inevitably
undermine the integrity of his standing and statements, and confound the purposes of justice." But
Gaylin also recognizes, and lawyers should as well, the pressure that the legal system places on experts
to de-emphasize ambiguities and uncertainties. Id. at 193-99; see supra, note 45.
94. See supra note 40.
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the respect that the law affords psychoanalytically-oriented expert wit-
nesses who base their opinions in part on their belief in a particular version
of events that happened in the past. The greater the significance of the
historical truth to the opinions of experts, the more their testimony is likely
to rest on unverified or unverifiable premises. Moreover, their premises are
often precisely the "facts" about which it is the jury's obligation to be
agnostic until persuaded of those facts by admissible evidence. Liberaliza-
tion of the rules of evidence surrounding expert testimony has exacerbated
rather than improved this testimonial situation, and few trial lawyers have
the skills to persuade the jury to set aside an expert's opinion because of a
quarrel about the factual premises on which it rests.
Recently, scholars and some courts have expressed doubts about the
wisdom and propriety of reliance on mental health professionals as expert
witnesses concerning the prediction of the future. 95 The same critical
attention might profitably be turned to our frequent, unacknowledged
reliance on the same professionals as experts concerning the facts about the
past.
95. See supra note 6.
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